O livro Paulo Freire: uma arqueologia bibliográfica é fruto de um denso esforço investigativo que reuniu pesquisadores(as) brasileiros(as) sobre o pensamento freireano, buscando analisar e evidenciar o conjunto de influências presentes em sua obra. Na forma de uma arqueologia, escava o conjunto de escritos de Freire desde o final dos anos de 1950, até as obras publicadas postumamente. Como resultado, elenca e analisa no formato de verbetes 501 presenças identificadas nos seus livros, incluindo autores e autoras, instituições, pessoas, lugares e (...) fatos históricos, proporcionando aos leitores e às leitoras um amplo panorama teórico e conceitual do seu pensamento político e pedagógico. Portanto, este livro é indicada a estudantes, pesquisadores e demais interessados em compreender a complexa e densa estrutura teórica que Paulo Freire consolidou em seus mais de 30 livros publicados. A expressão “Arqueologia bibliográfica” pretende remeter à compreensão que o próprio Paulo Freire tinha da consciência, respectivamente da conscientização, como uma construção histórica composta por complexas tramas que se relacionam de muitas formas, ora se contrapondo, ora se complementando ou confirmando, todas elas compondo um estar-no-mundo único. O livro apresenta instrumentos que auxiliam a encontrar peças e rastros deixados nas páginas por esse nosso grande educador, que inspirem olhares mais profundos e mais largos sobre a educação em nosso tempo. Com as informações sobre a bibliografia referida neste livro, cada leitor e cada leitora poderá compor com mais propriedade a sua própria narrativa sobre Paulo Freire e sua obra. (shrink)

Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel’s position intuitively more plausible than Goldman’s, we also find Siegel’s defence of it wanting. We suggest (...) novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel’s own arguments but look to us more promising. (shrink)

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...) If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on transmission and failure of transmission of warrant. We identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for transmission of warrant, and we show that their satisfaction grounds a number of interesting epistemic phenomena that have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. We then scrutinise Wright’s analysis of transmission failure and improve on extant readings of it. Nonetheless, we present a Bayesian counterexample that shows that Wright’s analysis is partially incoherent with our analysis of (...) warrant transmission and prima facie defective. We conclude exploring three alternative lines of reply: developing a more satisfactory account of transmission failure, which we outline; dismissing the Bayesian counterexample by rejecting some of its assumptions; reinterpreting Wright’s analysis to make it immune to the counterexample. (shrink)

I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.

Dado o crescente aumento da ocorrência e da gravidade dos conflitos em ambientes escolares, o presente estudo dedica-se a observar como tem sido conduzida a iniciativa das Comissões Internas de Prevenção de Acidentes e Violências Escolares, tendo por cenário as escolas da rede pública estadual de Viamão, Rio Grande do Sul. A observação do aumento e do agravamento dos conflitos não se restringe aos ambientes escolares. De forma generalizada, é possível verificar que a sociedade tem sofrido crescentemente com situações de (...) conflito, o que se pode verificar com o volume cada vez maior de processos judiciais e com a escalada da violência e da criminalidade, por exemplo. No Município de Viamão, essas questões são bastante evidentes. Na condução das análises, a questão norteadora para a elaboração do problema de pesquisa busca investigar, como instrumental de gerenciamento de conflitos e violências em ambiente escolar, quais são os principais limites e potencialidades das CIPAVEs segundo a percepção dos integrantes das equipes gestoras das escolas investigadas. Para responder a essa questão, foram analisadas ocorrências registradas durante os anos de 2016, 2017 e 2018 pelas escolas da Rede Pública Estadual de Ensino do Município de Viamão, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, na base de dados Mapeamento CIPAVE, política pública de iniciativa estadual voltada ao manejo de conflitos escolares. Também foram investigadas as percepções manifestadas por integrantes das respectivas equipes gestoras acerca do gerenciamento das ocorrências referidas. A estratégia metodológica desenhada para o estudo é descritiva, exploratório-sequencial, combinando as abordagens quantitativa e qualitativa. Inicialmente, a moldura teórica da pesquisa é delineada a partir de revisão bibliográfica acerca da gestão de conflitos escolares, subsidiando a análise dos dados registrados na base da CIPAVE, compondo um panorama interdisciplinar para instrumentalizar o exame dos casos que se destacaram, empreendendo visitações nas escolas e entrevistas com os gestores. (shrink)

The book investigates the relationship between the economic and political writings of four seminal authors: Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Joseph A. Schumpeter, and..

I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt that (...) conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility, and thus to doubt the underdetermination argument. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...) of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism. (shrink)

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has (...) some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices. This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its antisceptical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances. (shrink)

In the history of modern political and economic thought, the work of Adam Smith has been of constant interest for two centuries. It has been the object of the most diverse interpretations and has continuously served as a strategic reference point for liberal and Marxist thought. For the latter, however, it does not seem to represent a substantial source of inspiration today. In contrast, liberal thinkers continue to regard themselves as the legitimate interpreters of Smith’s thought. Such a generic reference (...) to liberal thought, obviously, may sound vague. It is difficult, however, to refer in any other way to the continuous flourishing of reflections that, before anything else, point to the market as the proper strategic place for any decision, whether or not it is combined with considerations of ethical pluralism. This is not surprising, because Smith is not an author one can ignore; it is also not surprising that liberalism does not take much pains to reinterpret Smith. In other words, liberalism does not seem to be able to do without a traditional reading of Smith—the “Mandevilleian” Smith, who taught us not to look beyond self-interest. It cannot do without this reading because liberal thought itself has created such a reading by virtually ignoring, for two centuries, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. And, even when more sophisticated interpreters take up the task of reinterpreting Smith, they are usually not willing to grant the importance due to the social, non-individualistic aspect of Smith’s ethics. (shrink)

[NOTE: I WROTE THIS PAPER BEFORE STARTING MY PhD. SO DON'T EXPECT TOO MUCH.] Laudan and Leplin have argued that empirically equivalent theories can elude underdetermination by resorting to indirect confirmation. Moreover, they have provided a qualitative account of indirect confirmation that Okasha has shown to be incoherent. In this paper, I develop Kukla's recent contention that indirect confirmation is grounded in the probability calculus. I provide a Bayesian rule to calculate the probability of a hypothesis given indirect evidence. I (...) also suggest that the application of the rule presupposes the methodological relevance of non‐empirical virtues of theories. If this is true, Laudan and Leplin's strategy will not work in many cases. Moreover, without an independent way of justifying the role of non‐empirical virtues in methodology, the scientific realists cannot use indirect evidence to defeat underdetermination. (shrink)

Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Structure, Change, and Survival: A Response To Winthrop-youngFranco Moretti (bio)Geoffrey Winthrop-Young’s is the sort of review article one dreams of: long, intelligent, and very generous. So, first of all, thanks. And thanks also for the clarity with which disagreements are expressed. In the same spirit, here is a brief response.The first area of disagreement comes early in the article, when Winthrop-Young claims that in the Atlas, “the here (...) and now of a specific location suffers something akin to the fate of a Barthesian myth: its specificity is subordinated to a signifying function as part of an established narrative sequence. But as Moretti chooses not to address the question of how this transformation is achieved, his discussion tends to gloss over the differences between geographical, literary, and imaginary locations” [7]. Frankly, I don’t think this is true. I often do exactly what Winthrop-Young demands, using a sequence of maps to clarify the successive steps by which a geographical space ends up supporting a specific narrative strucure: see the Austen maps that open the book, or the picaresque sequence in the first chapter, or the Balzac and Dickens maps in the second chapter—where I also address the issue in conceptual terms in a section entitled “Stories of the Third.” It’s true that I don’t do so in every case (as perhaps I should), and Winthrop-Young may of course disagree with the way I chart the transformation of space into narrative, but he cannot deny that I am doing so. The fact that those maps compose sequences of increasing complexity (as is particularly clear for Austen and Our Mutual Friend) proves precisely that I am indeed mapping a “transformation” of relatively simple beginnings into a complicated final structure. Incidentally, I do something similar in Modern Epic, where I describe how Joyce’s stream of consciousness “grows” from rather slim paragraphs to the plump ones we read now, or follow the slow rise of Ulysses’s polyphony. Again: my theses may be wrong—but they are an attempt to follow the step-by-step structuration of a text (or genre). This, after all, is the basic test of critical materialism: if we cannot describe the how and the why of the various steps, we are implicitly invoking “creativity” as an explanation for literary products. Which is a bit like invoking God. But on the futility of this, Winthrop-Young and I probably agree.The second disagreement regards the tempo of literary history: does morphological change occur in brief bursts separated by long periods of stasis (as in Eldredge and Gould’s punctuated equilibria)—or is it more evenly distributed across time? Here, Winthrop-Young claims [36, fn 5] that my attempt to see Schwarz’s account of Brazilian modernism and the genesis of magic realism as a single instance of punctuated equilibria is contradicted by historical evidence. He is right. Years ago, I adopted punctuated equilibria because it proved better than any rival theory at explaining the peculiar rapidity of many literary turning points (baroque drama; the rise of the British novel; the modernist season of European literature). From this initial conviction, I was (unconsciously) led to generalize, and to treat every case of major morphological change as an instance of punctuated equilibria. This was silly, and Winthrop-Young is right in criticizing me. However, he would probably agree that a single (or even a few) contrary [End Page 41] instances do not invalidate a theory in its entirety, and that what we most need is to know more about how literary change occurs. Only after such an empirical reconnaissance will the testing of theories be on a truly sound basis. Personally, I wouldn’t be surprised if we discovered that literary change can occur in more than one way, and that we need more than one theory to account for it; still, all I know of literary history suggests that punctuated equilibria will be the theory with greatest explanatory power.The last disagreement concerns literary selection: specifically, whether my view of it is indeed Darwinian, or whether I Lamarck-like “transform the concept of selection from the traditional passive filter... (shrink)

The search for the best wellness practice has promoted the development of devices integrating different technologies and guided meditation. However, the final effects on the electrical activity of the brain remain relatively sparse. Here, we have analyzed of the alpha and theta electroencephalographic oscillations during the realization of the arrest reaction when a chromotherapy session performed in a dedicated room [Rebalance device], with an ergonomic bed integrating pulsed-wave light stimulation, guided breathing, and body scan exercises. We demonstrated that the PWL (...) induced an evoked-related potential characterized by the N2-P3 components maximally recorded on the fronto-central areas and accompanied by an event-related synchronization of the delta–theta–alpha oscillations. The power of the alpha and theta oscillations was analyzed during repeated ARs testing realized along with the whole RB session. We showed that the power of the alpha and theta oscillations was significantly increased during the session in comparison to their values recorded before. Of the 14 participants, 11 and 6 showed a significant power increase of the alpha and theta oscillations, respectively. These increased powers were not observed in two different control groups who stayed passively outside or inside the RB room but without any type of stimulation. These preliminary results suggest that PWL chromotherapy and guided relaxation induce measurable electrical brain changes that could be beneficial under neuropsychiatric perspectives. (shrink)

This monograph contrasts two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE), more recent and currently dominant in most school systems around the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of the school systems of Northern Europe. CBE is assessment-oriented and interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD, which approach education from the perspective of human capital theory. BOE is instead teaching-oriented and characterises learning holistically (...) as aimed at the progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Emerged in Northern Europe under the influence of the ideals of the Enlightenment and Neo-Humanism of individual and collective autonomy and responsibility, BOE was subsequently enriched with a hermeneutical approach to teaching and socio-political objectives of emancipation and solidarity originating within Critical Theory. The book first analyses CBE and argues that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, it is internally incoherent and unreliable, contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, can foster social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need as both human beings and citizens of our complex post-industrial societies. Then, it introduces BOE and articulates and defends an updated version of it from objections raised by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers. It argues that BOE is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, can reduce structural forms of oppression and injustice, and can heal social pathologies. (shrink)

Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how (...) the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti (2005) and define two evidence-gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science. (shrink)

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of (...) epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls. (shrink)

The umbrella-term ‘executive functions’ includes various domain-general, goal-directed cognitive abilities responsible for behavioral self-regulation. The influential unity and diversity model of EF posits the existence of three correlated yet separable executive domains: inhibition, shifting and updating. These domains may be influenced by factors such as socioeconomic status and culture, possibly due to the way EF tasks are devised and to biased choice of stimuli, focusing on first-world testees. Here, we propose a FREE test battery that includes two open-access tasks for (...) each of the three abovementioned executive domains to allow latent variables to be obtained. The tasks were selected from those that have been shown to be representative of each domain, that are not copyrighted and do not require special hardware/software to be administered. These tasks were adapted for use in populations with varying SES/schooling levels by simplifying tasks/instructions and using easily recognized stimuli such as pictures. Items are answered verbally and tasks are self-paced to minimize interference from individual differences in psychomotor and perceptual speed, to better isolate executive from other cognitive abilities. We tested these tasks on 146 early adolescents of both sexes and varying SES, because this is the age group in which the executive domains of interest become distinguishable and in order to confirm that SES effects were minimized. Performance was determined by Rate Correct Scores, which consider speed-accuracy trade-offs. Scores were sensitive to the expected improvement in performance with age and rarely/inconsistently affected by sex and SES, as expected, with no floor or ceiling effects, or skewed distribution, thus suggesting their adequacy for diverse populations in these respects. Using structural equation modeling, evidence based on internal structure was obtained by replicating the three correlated-factor solution proposed by the authors of the model. We conclude that the FREE test battery, which is open access and described in detail, holds promise as a tool for research that can be adapted for a wide range of populations, as well as altered and/or complemented in coming studies. (shrink)

The logical hexagon (or hexagon of opposition) is a strange, yet beautiful, highly symmetrical mathematical figure, mysteriously intertwining fundamental logical and geometrical features. It was discovered more or less at the same time (i.e. around 1950), independently, by a few scholars. It is the successor of an equally strange (but mathematically less impressive) structure, the “logical square” (or “square of opposition”), of which it is a much more general and powerful “relative”. The discovery of the former did not raise interest, (...) neither among logicians, nor among philosophers of logic, whereas the latter played a very important theoretical role (both for logic and philosophy) for nearly two thousand years, before falling in disgrace in the first half of the twentieth century: it was, so to say, “sentenced to death” by the so-called analytical philosophers and logicians. Contrary to this, since 2004 a new, unexpected promising branch of mathematics (dealing with “oppositions”) has appeared, “oppositional geometry” (also called “n-opposition theory”, “NOT”), inside which the logical hexagon (as well as its predecessor, the logical square) is only one term of an infinite series of “logical bi-simplexes of dimension m”, itself just one term of the more general infinite series (of series) of the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”. In this paper we recall the main historical and the main theoretical elements of these neglected recent discoveries. After proposing some new results, among which the notion of “hybrid logical hexagon”, we show which strong reasons, inside oppositional geometry, make understand that the logical hexagon is in fact a very important and profound mathematical structure, destined to many future fruitful developments and probably bearer of a major epistemological paradigm change. (shrink)

Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

Dummett has recently presented his most mature and sophisticated version of justificationism, i.e. the view that meaning and truth are to be analysed in terms of justifiability. In this paper, I argue that this conception does not resolve a difficulty that also affected Dummett’s earlier version of justificationism: the problem that large tracts of the past continuously vanish as their traces in the present dissipate. Since Dummett’s justificationism is essentially based on the assumption that the speaker has limited (i.e. non-idealized) (...) cognitive powers, no further refinement of this position is likely to settle the problem of the vanishing past. (shrink)

The general tendency or attitude that Dreier 2004 calls creeping minimalism is ramping up in contemporary analytic philosophy. Those who entertain this attitude will take for granted a framework of deflationary or minimal notions – principally semantical1 and ontological – by means of which to analyse problems in different philosophical fields – e.g. theory of truth, metaethics, philosophy of language, the debate on realism and antirealism, etc. Let us call sweeping minimalist the philosopher affected by creeping minimalism. The framework of (...) minimal notions that the sweeping minimalist takes for granted encompasses, for instance, the concept of truth, reference, proposition, fact, individual, and property. Minimal notions are characterized in terms of general platitudinous principles expressed by schemata like the following (cf.: 26): ‘S’ is true if and only if S; ‘S’ is true if and only if ‘S’ corresponds to the facts; a has the property of being P if and only if a is P. Where ‘S’ and ‘a is P’ stand for sentences satisfying superficial constraints of truth-aptitude (i.e. sentences in declarative form subject to communally acknowledged standards of proper use), and.. (shrink)

This is the first edition of the Italian translation of J.A. Schumpeter’s last conference. The intervention analyzes the relationship between institutional change and capitalism with particular reference to the United States after the Second World War. It is at the same time a recapitulation of the most relevant Schumpeterian economic and political concepts. Translation and Introduction by Adelino Zanini: Of a "Private Writing". A Short Note on the Very Latest Schumpeter.

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

This paper supports the need for health professionals to be trained in argumentation theory, by illustrating the challenges that they face in interacting with patients and according to the different models of consultation that patients prefer. While there is no ideal model of consultation that can be promoted universally, the ability to construct arguments in support of health professionals’ points of view, as well as the ability to engage in critical discussion with patients, translate in essential skills for reaching patients’ (...) agreement when communication develops through the interpretative model or the informed decision model or, eventually, shared decision-making. Keywords: models of consultation, argumentation skills, medical training, patient-centeredness, informed consent. (shrink)

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.

According to Wrights minimalism, a notion of truth neutral with respect to realism and antirealism can be built out of the notion of warranted assertibility and a set of a priori platitudes among which the Equivalence Schema has a prominent role. Wright believes that the debate about realism and antirealism will be properly and fruitfully developed if both parties accept the conceptual framework of minimalism. In this paper, I show that this conceptual framework commits the minimalist to the realist thesis (...) that there are mind-independent propositions; with the consequence that minimalism is not neutral to realism and antirealism. I suggest that Wright could avert this conclusion if he rejected the customary interpretation of the Equivalence Schema according to which this Schema applies to propositions. This would however render minimalism unpalatable to philosophers who welcome the traditional reading of the Equivalence Schema and believe that propositions are bearers of truth. (shrink)

In 1995 Slater argued both against Priest’s paraconsistent system LP (1979) and against paraconsistency in general, invoking the fundamental opposition relations ruling the classical logical square. Around 2002 Béziau constructed a double defence of paraconsistency (logical and philosophical), relying, in its philosophical part, on Sesmat’s (1951) and Blanche’s (1953) “logical hexagon”, a geometrical, conservative extension of the logical square, and proposing a new (tridimensional) “solid of opposition”, meant to shed new light on the point raised by Slater. By using n-opposition (...) theory (NOT) we analyse Beziau’s anti-Slater move and show both its right intuitions and its technical limits. Moreover, we suggest that Slater’s criticism is much akin to a well-known one by Suszko (1975) against the conceivability of many-valued logics. This last criticism has been addressed by Malinowski (1990) and Shramko and Wansing (2005), who developed a family of tenable logical counter-examples to it: trans-Suszkian systems are radically many-valued. This family of new logics has some strange logical features, essentially: each system has more than one consequence operator. We show that a new, deeper part of the aforementioned geometry of logical oppositions (NOT), the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”, generates new logical-geometrical structures, essentially many-valued, which could be a very natural (and intuitive) geometrical counterpart to the “strange”, new, non-Suszkian logics of Malinowski, Shramko and Wansing. By a similar move, the geometry of opposition therefore sheds light both on the foundations of paraconsistent logics and on those of many-valued logics. (shrink)

O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar o bem-estar dos trabalhadores da saúde de um centro de reabilitação e readaptação, relacionando-o com a crença no mundo justo e com o lócus de controle. Participaram 146 profissionais que responderam a um questionário formado por perguntas sobre dados sócio-demog..

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression, since Burman thinks that both forms of power are transparent to social agents. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we question the thesis that telic power can exist without deontic power. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Against Burman, we suggest that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a mutual recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, an acceptance of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require acceptance of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)

One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky and still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright’s proposal is the so-called Leaching (...) worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence-based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Entitlement theorist two distinct responses. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on the so-called "tacking by disjunction problem". Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis H is confirmed by a statement E, H is confirmed by the disjunction E v F, for whatever statement F. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

The concept of extent of reaction was discussed many times in physical chemistry journals and books. This contribution strongly suggests the use of the extent of reaction as standard basic tool in teaching stoichiometry. The same idea was suggested several times in the past without success because the concept of extent of reaction is still not presented in the first-year general chemistry textbooks. It is also remarked that the concept of extent of reaction represents a simple example of the way (...) of attaining a mathematization of chemistry, that is chemistry thought and made with the mathematical way of thinking, i.e. using variables, symbols and functions. Presenting the concept of the extent of reaction within the general chemistry curriculum will support successive physical chemistry courses, as these courses make extensive use of this powerful concept when teaching thermodynamics and kinetics of chemical reactions. (shrink)

Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to (...) acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification. (shrink)

This article explores some of the crucial conceptual dimensions of Italian workerist Marxism [operaismo], identifying both its underlying impetus and its limits in particular interpretations of Marxian concepts. Particular emphasis is placed on the manner in which the focus of workerists such as Mario Tronti and Antonio Negri on living labour, antagonism and class-composition can be understood in terms of a philosophy of subjectivity founded on a Marxian conception of difference.

I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.

Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer's notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich's notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role (...) reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists. (shrink)